ABSTRACT
The series of events that have come to be called the Holocaust raise a number of issues. Some have been extensively studied, but others have not been treated in depth or are still scarcely known despite the immense literature this theme has generated. The problem of representing the Holocaust has been extensively studied, most recently by Inga Clendinnen, but not in the context of the wider epistemological problem of knowledge of history. Aristotle, who raises the theme of knowledge of singular events early in the tradition in a famous comment in passing, was obviously not thinking of the Holocaust. Hempel's controversial, reductionist view of history denies the distinction between nature and history in order to apply methods arguably appropriate for knowledge of the former to the latter. Constructivism rather refers to a generally Kantian approach to knowledge, including historical knowledge. This chapter studies the real conditions of representing the Holocaust, with special attention to the uniqueness claim.
