ABSTRACT
John Rawls's famous difference principle is capable of at least some distinct statements, each of which occurs in A Theory of Justice. This chapter examines and criticizes the Revisionist Principle, which has been defended at most length by Rex Martin in his book Rawls And Rights. It begins by describing in more detail Rawls's remarks about the Principle, and its relationship to the Simple Principle. The chapter explores the possibilities that the revisionist response to the failure of Rawls's maximin argument for the Simple Principle is grounded inadequately or logically flawed. The importance of the Revisionist Principle stems in Part from the inadequacy of Rawls's central hypothetical contractarian argument for the Simple Principle. The chapter outlines a significant flaw in Rawls's central argument, which motivates the search for the alternative defense. It concludes that the Principle is defective, and that Rawlsians should search elsewhere for a defense of the difference principle.
