ABSTRACT
This chapter includes most prominently, religious disagreements, but also disagreements among various secular conceptions of the good. In the first model, each conception of the good is associated with or generates a particular vision of the just society. In the second model, particular theories of justice are not seen as tied to or generated by particular conceptions of the good. On the other hand, fitting Rawls's account into the second model presupposes that he actually contemplates disagreements about justice in a well-ordered society. If, however, there is disagreement about justice, and people make proper use of public reason to articulate and resolve it, it would seem churlish to deny that such disagreement was—initially, at any rate—reasonable. Justice is important: in a way, nothing is more important in the basic structuring of society. If justice is the first virtue of social institutions, then surely nothing—including political procedures, including voting—is more important.
