ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses a number of distinctions concerning the nature of the force that can be ascribed to precedents. Precedents can be regarded as prima facie reasons for excluding many other reasons from legal argumentation. In common law systems, much precedent is formally binding and some has lesser normative force. In particular, a legal system may thus regard precedents as formally binding. However, any non-normative interpretation of 'binding de facto' is contrary to the lawyers' internal understanding of legal practice in some countries. A theorist may thus interpret the expression 'de facto bindingness' as referring to some statistical regularity, supposing it to be established empirically that judges regularly follow certain precedents. In Poland neither the law nor doctrine uses the fine distinctions between precedents 'having force', 'providing further support' and being 'merely illustrative'. By analogy, the distinction between 'defeasible' and 'outweighable' force is not explicitly discussed by the judges either.
