ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that regionalism in Asia after the financial crisis departs significantly from its pre-crisis incarnation. Specifically, an understanding of the post-crisis regionalism requires a state-centric approach and an analysis of power relations in the global economy. The countries of Asia did not participate in the wave of regionalism, which proved popular with other developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Regional integration processes therefore led to the identification by economists and policy analysts of a 'regional economy' within Asia as well as in a number of sub-regions. For some, financial panic provides the most plausible explanation with the irrational behaviour of foreign investors to blame for the sudden dramatic reversal in capital flows to the region. China's feeling that its 'constructive strategic partnership relationship' with the United States ought to be reaping more rewards in terms of international recognition was given the chance for further expression and correction in June 1998.
