ABSTRACT
David Hume was aware of the principal figures in shaping, and opposing, what Pocock calls "the common law mind". He cites nearly all of them – Coke, Hale, Selden, and Spelman and Brady – as authorities at various points in his History of England. In the rare cases where Hume's work has been considered in relation to the common law, scholars have read his account of law and justice as naturally supportive of the views of England's common lawyers. While such an interpretation of Hume's relationship to common law represents a departure from past readings, it nevertheless fits easily with, and supports, a widely-influential interpretation of his political philosophy as a whole. Common lawyers could only recoil at the limits on judicial discretion that Hume expects to be imposed by the higher, central power. For them, the judge's reasoning is almost a sacred act, not subject to outside interference.
