ABSTRACT

The problem at the centre of Philip Jones’s research – the relationship between communes and despots, or signori – is closely intertwined with longstanding debates over the magnates. Many towns in the mid-to late-thirteenth century imposed severe restrictions on a list of elite lineages whom they termed magnates, on the grounds that they posed a violent threat to their neighbours and to the good and peaceful state of the commune. This was linked to the gradual shift to limit political participation to members of guilds and popular societies. The details varied from town to town, but magnates were required to post a large security against the possibility that they might commit a crime, and were subject to severe penalties if they did harm a popolano. Special judicial mechanisms were developed to facilitate denunciation of magnate offences. At the same time, systems designed to muster popular militias were strengthened to provide a counterweight to the military power of magnates, their allies and retainers. These efforts by medieval Italian communes to impose restrictions on noble families were driven in part by the realistic fear that one of them might take over as signore.1