ABSTRACT
In his paper ‘Animal Rights’ (Analysis 37.4) R. G. Frey disputes what he refers to as ‘the most important … argument’ for the view that ‘animals do have rights’ (p. 186). Frey formulates the argument in the following way :
Each and every criterion for the possession of rights that excludes animals from the class of right-holders also excludes babies and the severely mentally-enfeebled from the class of right-holders;
Babies and the severely mentally-enfeebled, however, do have rights and so fall within the class of right-holders;
Therefore, each and every one of these animal-excluding criteria must be rejected as a criterion for the possession of rights (pp. 186–7).
Frey’s position is that premiss (2) ‘is not obvious and requires defence’, and that ‘the best defences of it, if they stand at all, specifically exclude animals from the class of right-holders’ (p. 187). The dilemma this is supposed to pose for those who argue for animal rights is this : ‘either premiss (2) cannot be defended or else premiss (1)… is false’ (ib.). ‘In either case,’ Frey concludes, ‘this most important argument in behalf of animal rights fails’ (ib.).