ABSTRACT
In his book, Dependent Rational Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes what he says is a flagrant deficiency of western moral philosophy: its inattention to human vulnerability. This chapter argues that, despite MacIntyre's good intentions, his ethics—like others that deny natural rights—is unlikely to help significantly protect the most vulnerable people in the world. It summarizes MacIntyre's four main arguments against the human-rights tradition such as the "Witch Argument," the "Taboo Argument," the "Commonality Argument," and the "Primacy Argument." The chapter also summarizes Amy Gutmann's criticisms of the first two arguments, which appeared in After Virtue, and it extends these criticisms to additional points. It focuses on the two remaining arguments, formulated in 1990s papers, the essay shows that these arguments fail because they beg the question; misrepresent or ignore the work of various philosophers, like Thomas Aquinas and John Rawls, who counter them; and inconsistently reject the concepts of conscience and reason that are central to MacIntyre's own espoused Thomist traditions.
