ABSTRACT
Facts essays a strategy for a head-on, rationalistic response to the paradoxes of scepticism that was broadly inspired by one central element in Wittgenstein's notes On Certainty, and which the author have subsequently developed in a fashion whose most significant stages are marked in "Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon", "(Anti)-Sceptics, Simple and Subtle", "Warrant for Nothing" and "Welfare State Epistemology". Facts was preoccupied with Humean scepticism and fashions its response under the aegis of a number of 'rules of engagement' which continued to regard as vital constraints on any intellectually satisfying response to any of the sceptical paradoxes. Humean skepticism contrasts with the Cartesian variety in two important respects. First, it engages large classes of our beliefs for which we conceive of even the strongest warrant as essentially based on indirect, defeasible evidence. Second there is, in the Humean case, no reliance on the closure of warrant across known entailment.
