ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates how presentism accounts for our experience of time and describes more general problem that arises for presentism and perceptual experience. It provides a brief overview of the debate on temporal perception and presents three prominent views of temporal perception: anti-realism, retentionalism and extensionalism. The goal, in each case, is not to evaluate the theory but to evaluate how each fare with regard to presentism. The chapter argues that the combination of presentism, an indirect theory of perception and retentionalism is most likely able to account for experiences of change, depending on a viable presentist account of causal relations. It suggests that none of the combinations considered can accommodate experiences of temporal passage in the sense relevant for presentists. Motivated presentists might consider a non-standard form of presentism according to which the objective present has a short non-zero duration, long enough to house an experience which is itself temporally extended but wholly present.
