ABSTRACT
As a designation for a subject of philosophical inquiry, 'temporal experience" is suggestively ambiguous. It can refer to the informing of experience by temporality: in what manner, and to what extent, experience is temporally structured. Or it can pertain to how temporal features are experienced: whether experience portrays them correctly, which capacities are used to represent them, and so forth. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers answers to both kinds of question as he describes the mind's contributions to experience. Kant argues that the representation of time could not be empirical because it is already presupposed by the representation of things as existing simultaneously or successively. Kant's argument has been defended by construing it as an attack on relationalist, empiricist views, on which the representation of space is formed by abstracting an ordering from experience of particular things. In particular, Kant has been credited with the point that representation of spatial relationships uniquely presupposes a spatial framework.
