ABSTRACT
Gibson (1990) proposed a new perspective on the evolution and development of cognitive capacities that combines a reformulation of Jerison’s (1973, 1985) theory of brain evolution, parallel distributed models of information processing (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), and Piagetian (Piaget, 1967/1971) and neoPiagetian (Case, 1985; Langer, 1986) developmental theories of intelligence. In this perspective, intellectual differences between humans and animals, as well as between animal species, reflect brain-size-mediated expansions of mental constructional skills. In animals with small brains or poorly interconnected perceptual and motor systems, mental constructions are minimal. Objects are recognized on the basis of simple key stimuli, behavior consists mainly of modal action patterns (Barlow, 1968), and stimulus-response associations are automatic. In species that have evolved expanded brain size and rich neural networks, more perceptual, motor, and conceptual units can be held and processed simultaneously. The discrete units are combined and recombined to produce fine perceptual discriminations and to construct object images, object-object relationships, and flexible and hierarchically organized behavioral patterns.
