ABSTRACT
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) regarding how one accesses source in formation from memory. As previously discussed (Roberts, & Blades, this volume), the source-monitoring framework asserts that source is attributed through a decision-making process. One way that people attribute source involves an examination of the qualitative character istics of activated memories (Johnson et al., 1993). For example, one might “correctly attribute a memory of a conversation to imagination on the basis of knowledge that one is not acquainted with that person” (Johnson et al., 1993, p. 4). In addition to the quality of memory char acteristics, source-monitoring judgments are also influenced by such factors as metamemory and one’s current goals and agendas (John son et al., 1993). In terms of metamemory, one’s knowledge that expe rienced events are accompanied by clear memories with rich perceptual detail will prevent one from accepting imagined memories (which are not as clear and perceptually rich) as something that was actually experienced. Additionally, source-monitoring judgments may involve more effortful strategic processes, depending on the goal or agenda when reporting an event. For example, in formal situations, such as testifying in court, one may reflect seriously on memories be fore making source attributions. In less formal situations, such as so cial gatherings with friends, less deliberate processes may be used when making source attributions.
