ABSTRACT
Reason has long been regarded in the Western tradition as a God-given gift separating man from other animals, while emotion was seen as a relic of primitive drives best suppressed and ignored where decision-making is involved. Voices challenging this, such as Hume’s empiricist argument that desire shapes our basic goals and that reason merely guides us in their attainment-“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other offi ce than to serve and obey them” (Hume 1739)—suggesting a complementarity between the two aspects, were sidelined by subsequent bureaucratic structures and procedures. As noted in the fi rst chapter, the role of emotion in confl ict was quite explicitly highlighted by von Clausewitz and recognised by his military successors. However this tended to be neglected in subsequent analytical development, though of course practitioners of confl ict-generals, politicians, managersremained acutely aware of these features of interaction and took account of them in their dealings with other parties. This apparent bifurcation between doers and advisers is a pervasive one: consider the contrast between the emotional, highly-charged world of government and the coldly rational stance required of civil servants whose task is to provide politicians with objective advice.
