ABSTRACT
A considerable proportion of the recent academic literature on asymmetric conict (AC) has highlighted the effects of “domestic-level” political factors on the military strategies of violent nonstate organizations (VNSOs).* Numerous authors have acknowledged that many VNSOs, like national governments, incorporate considerations of political power and popular legitimacy into their policy decisions, and thus are responsive to the demands and needs of the people who constitute their popular base or constituency. Such an approach to the analysis of VNSOs’ military behavior is consistent with well-established international relations’ theoretical approaches underscoring the role of domestic politics in shaping foreign policy decisions. These can be summarized by the words of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1992), who have suggested that, “every foreign policy maker must look over his or her shoulder and contemplate the prospective domestic political risks associated with each foreign policy action”† (p. 638).
