did, however, considerably extend the concept of safe systems of work. After Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) it was immediately arguable that the worker might, in a sense, be regarded as a ‘consumer’, to whom the manufacturer owed a duty of care in relation to products. Additionally, there is, in the decision, an indication that, in order to discharge their duty, the manufacturer may have to work with the employer to identify the uses to which the employer intends to put the substance and then take into account whether this use creates any risk which might not be present in other types of user. The existence of the manufacturer’s duty was not denied in Davie v New Merton Board Mills (1959) which was in effect an employee’s attempt to make his employer vicariously liable for the negligence of the manufacturer of a tool. The Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, by allowing the employer to seek an indemnity from the manufacturer, also impliedly accepted that the manufacturer did have a duty to the employee. All these authorities, however, relate more to articles than to substances. It must be questionable whether the statute, being concerned with plant and equipment could be deemed to extend to substances (equipment is interpreted as ‘includes any plant and machinery, vehicle, aircraft and clothing’). Today, the workers might have preferred to sue ICI as producers under the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Liability under that Act is strict and it is not immediately apparent that ICI would have been able to plead any of the defences provided by the statute. Finally, the Dunlop and GKN cases mark an increased awareness, due partly to improved medical knowledge, and partly to changing forms of manufacturing processes, that workers are as much, if not more, at risk of suffering injury from exposure to dangerous substances as they are from exposure to dangerous plant and equipment. We are all neighbours It will be apparent that the majority of the cases determining who, apart from the employer, owed a common law duty of care to the worker were heard in the 1960s. The issue of determining relationships giving rise to a duty of care, in law, was really laid to rest by the following case. HOME OFFICE v DORSET YACHT CO LTD [1970] AC 1004 The case concerned the Home Office’s liability for property damage caused by Borstal boys when they escaped from the supervision of Borstal officers. The following brief extracts from the judgment of Lord Reid, beginning at p 1025, serve to clarify the attitude of the House of Lords:

DOI link for did, however, considerably extend the concept of safe systems of work. After Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) it was immediately arguable that the worker might, in a sense, be regarded as a ‘consumer’, to whom the manufacturer owed a duty of care in relation to products. Additionally, there is, in the decision, an indication that, in order to discharge their duty, the manufacturer may have to work with the employer to identify the uses to which the employer intends to put the substance and then take into account whether this use creates any risk which might not be present in other types of user. The existence of the manufacturer’s duty was not denied in Davie v New Merton Board Mills (1959) which was in effect an employee’s attempt to make his employer vicariously liable for the negligence of the manufacturer of a tool. The Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, by allowing the employer to seek an indemnity from the manufacturer, also impliedly accepted that the manufacturer did have a duty to the employee. All these authorities, however, relate more to articles than to substances. It must be questionable whether the statute, being concerned with plant and equipment could be deemed to extend to substances (equipment is interpreted as ‘includes any plant and machinery, vehicle, aircraft and clothing’). Today, the workers might have preferred to sue ICI as producers under the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Liability under that Act is strict and it is not immediately apparent that ICI would have been able to plead any of the defences provided by the statute. Finally, the Dunlop and GKN cases mark an increased awareness, due partly to improved medical knowledge, and partly to changing forms of manufacturing processes, that workers are as much, if not more, at risk of suffering injury from exposure to dangerous substances as they are from exposure to dangerous plant and equipment. We are all neighbours It will be apparent that the majority of the cases determining who, apart from the employer, owed a common law duty of care to the worker were heard in the 1960s. The issue of determining relationships giving rise to a duty of care, in law, was really laid to rest by the following case. HOME OFFICE v DORSET YACHT CO LTD [1970] AC 1004 The case concerned the Home Office’s liability for property damage caused by Borstal boys when they escaped from the supervision of Borstal officers. The following brief extracts from the judgment of Lord Reid, beginning at p 1025, serve to clarify the attitude of the House of Lords:

did, however, considerably extend the concept of safe systems of work. After Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) it was immediately arguable that the worker might, in a sense, be regarded as a ‘consumer’, to whom the manufacturer owed a duty of care in relation to products. Additionally, there is, in the decision, an indication that, in order to discharge their duty, the manufacturer may have to work with the employer to identify the uses to which the employer intends to put the substance and then take into account whether this use creates any risk which might not be present in other types of user. The existence of the manufacturer’s duty was not denied in Davie v New Merton Board Mills (1959) which was in effect an employee’s attempt to make his employer vicariously liable for the negligence of the manufacturer of a tool. The Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969, by allowing the employer to seek an indemnity from the manufacturer, also impliedly accepted that the manufacturer did have a duty to the employee. All these authorities, however, relate more to articles than to substances. It must be questionable whether the statute, being concerned with plant and equipment could be deemed to extend to substances (equipment is interpreted as ‘includes any plant and machinery, vehicle, aircraft and clothing’). Today, the workers might have preferred to sue ICI as producers under the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Liability under that Act is strict and it is not immediately apparent that ICI would have been able to plead any of the defences provided by the statute. Finally, the Dunlop and GKN cases mark an increased awareness, due partly to improved medical knowledge, and partly to changing forms of manufacturing processes, that workers are as much, if not more, at risk of suffering injury from exposure to dangerous substances as they are from exposure to dangerous plant and equipment. We are all neighbours It will be apparent that the majority of the cases determining who, apart from the employer, owed a common law duty of care to the worker were heard in the 1960s. The issue of determining relationships giving rise to a duty of care, in law, was really laid to rest by the following case. HOME OFFICE v DORSET YACHT CO LTD [1970] AC 1004 The case concerned the Home Office’s liability for property damage caused by Borstal boys when they escaped from the supervision of Borstal officers. The following brief extracts from the judgment of Lord Reid, beginning at p 1025, serve to clarify the attitude of the House of Lords: