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(b) What is the content of the duty? Whether a duty is owed is a matter of law for the judge: whether the duty has been broken is a matter of fact. If, as was formerly the case, a jury were involved, the jury would decide whether the duty had been broken. Before, and for some years following, Donoghue v Stevenson, the content of the duty was a matter for the judge and the content varied from one category situation to another. This was especially the case as between employers’ liability and the two categories of occupiers’ liability. Employers’ liability The distinction between the content of the employer’s duty and that of other categories of duty relationships was emphasised by Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English (1938) which, it has been noted, in an earlier chapter, spelt out the employer’s personal duty in order to disentangle it from the doctrine of common employment. Subsequent cases built on the framework laid down in that case. Some of these cases might more properly be deemed today to be concerned with whether factually the duty had been broken (for example, Bux v Slough Metals Ltd (1974)) and they are therefore considered later under breach of duty. Occupiers’ liability to visitors Until the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 the duty of the occupier depended on the status of the visitor: thus within occupier’s liability, there were several sub-categories of duty. For example, the occupier’s liability to an invitee was different from that to a licensee. It was often difficult to determine to which category the visitor belonged. One of the purposes of the 1957 Act was to simplify the common law by removing the legal significance of these categories. This is now covered by the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. This Act was passed in order to simplify the earlier common law. It made the duty of the occupier to all its lawful visitors a duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances. OCCUPIERS’ LIABILITY ACT 1957
DOI link for (b) What is the content of the duty? Whether a duty is owed is a matter of law for the judge: whether the duty has been broken is a matter of fact. If, as was formerly the case, a jury were involved, the jury would decide whether the duty had been broken. Before, and for some years following, Donoghue v Stevenson, the content of the duty was a matter for the judge and the content varied from one category situation to another. This was especially the case as between employers’ liability and the two categories of occupiers’ liability. Employers’ liability The distinction between the content of the employer’s duty and that of other categories of duty relationships was emphasised by Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English (1938) which, it has been noted, in an earlier chapter, spelt out the employer’s personal duty in order to disentangle it from the doctrine of common employment. Subsequent cases built on the framework laid down in that case. Some of these cases might more properly be deemed today to be concerned with whether factually the duty had been broken (for example, Bux v Slough Metals Ltd (1974)) and they are therefore considered later under breach of duty. Occupiers’ liability to visitors Until the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 the duty of the occupier depended on the status of the visitor: thus within occupier’s liability, there were several sub-categories of duty. For example, the occupier’s liability to an invitee was different from that to a licensee. It was often difficult to determine to which category the visitor belonged. One of the purposes of the 1957 Act was to simplify the common law by removing the legal significance of these categories. This is now covered by the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. This Act was passed in order to simplify the earlier common law. It made the duty of the occupier to all its lawful visitors a duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances. OCCUPIERS’ LIABILITY ACT 1957
(b) What is the content of the duty? Whether a duty is owed is a matter of law for the judge: whether the duty has been broken is a matter of fact. If, as was formerly the case, a jury were involved, the jury would decide whether the duty had been broken. Before, and for some years following, Donoghue v Stevenson, the content of the duty was a matter for the judge and the content varied from one category situation to another. This was especially the case as between employers’ liability and the two categories of occupiers’ liability. Employers’ liability The distinction between the content of the employer’s duty and that of other categories of duty relationships was emphasised by Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English (1938) which, it has been noted, in an earlier chapter, spelt out the employer’s personal duty in order to disentangle it from the doctrine of common employment. Subsequent cases built on the framework laid down in that case. Some of these cases might more properly be deemed today to be concerned with whether factually the duty had been broken (for example, Bux v Slough Metals Ltd (1974)) and they are therefore considered later under breach of duty. Occupiers’ liability to visitors Until the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 the duty of the occupier depended on the status of the visitor: thus within occupier’s liability, there were several sub-categories of duty. For example, the occupier’s liability to an invitee was different from that to a licensee. It was often difficult to determine to which category the visitor belonged. One of the purposes of the 1957 Act was to simplify the common law by removing the legal significance of these categories. This is now covered by the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. This Act was passed in order to simplify the earlier common law. It made the duty of the occupier to all its lawful visitors a duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances. OCCUPIERS’ LIABILITY ACT 1957
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ABSTRACT
QUALCAST (WOLVERHAMPTON) LTD v HAYNES [1959] AC 743
The appellant employers were appealing against a judgment which had originally been made against them in the Wolverhampton County Court. The respondent, Haynes, was aged 38, and he had been a moulder all his working life. While the respondent was casting at the moulding boxes the ladle of molten metal which he was holding slipped and some of the metal splashed on to his left foot causing him some injury from which, after a few months, he entirely recovered. The respondent alleged that the appellants had failed to provide spats and/or other protective clothing. The appellants not only denied that they were negligent, but also said that the accident resulted from the negligence of the respondent himself. The county court judge apportioned three-quarters of the blame for causing the accident to the respondent and one-quarter to the appellants. The Court of Appeal affirmed that judgment.