automatically to be deduced. One should not be surprised by this apparent structural coherence, since it is a subject trying to determine the future rather than the past, as a case like Davis Contractors v Fareham UDC (p 593) so clearly indicates. Nevertheless, this structural coherence can mislead. Certainly, it is a subject with many rules and, thus, when compared with the other law of obligations subjects of tort and restitution (see Chapters 7–8), it can appear detailed and complex. Yet, when viewed from the position of the remedy— ought the plaintiff to get damages from the defendant or ought someone to be able to escape from what they have undertaken to do?—the problem can often be reduced to some basic issue where the court has to make a qualitative judgment of substance rather than simply apply some formal rule. Ought the court to imply a duty into this agreement? Was the plaintiff the cause of her own damage (cf Ingham v Ernes, p 532)? What are the responsibilities of one person negotiating with another person? The key to problem solving is often to identify these substantive issues and to translate them into legal concepts such as the implied term, consideration or condition, not forgetting, of course, the role of quasi-normative notions such as ‘expectation’ and Interest which
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