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arguments for developing a law of obligations in English law. Ought not equity to have intervened in Lister? How might it have done this? (Cf Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] 1 QB 792.) DAMAGE CAUSED TO ANOTHER (a) Damage
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Lord Porter:… The salient fact, as I see it, is that the wife had herself suffered no physical injury and could only base her claim on the circumstance that she had lost the consortium of her husband by reason of the injury to him. Such a claim was put forward on the analogy of the enticement cases… In that class of case, however, the wrong is a deliberate action taken with the object of inducing the wife to leave her husband or the husband to leave his wife-malicious because it is their mutual duty to give consortium to one another, and the defendant has persuaded the errant spouse not to fulfil that duty…

On behalf of the appellant, it is urged that a husband can bring an action for the loss of the consortium of his wife by reason of any tort which deprives him of that consortium and that in the circumstances prevailing today a wife must have a similar right. Even, however, if it be assumed that in enticement cases the husband and wife have equal rights it does not follow that today they have equal rights and liabilities one towards the other in all respects. I do not think it possible to say that a change in the outlook of the public, however great, must inevitably be followed by a change in the law of this country. The common law is a historical development rather than a logical whole, and the fact that a particular doctrine does not logically accord with another or others is no ground for its rejection…

Lord Goddard:… Negligence, if it is to give rise to legal liability, must result from a breach of duty owed to a person who thereby suffers damage. But what duty was owed here by the employers of the husband to the wife? If she has an action in this case, so must the wife of any man run over in the street by a careless driver. The duty there which gives rise to the husband’s cause of action arises out of what may for convenience be called proximity; the driver owes a duty not to injure other persons who are using the road on which he is driving. He owes no duty to persons not present except to those whose property may be on or adjoining the road which it is his duty to avoid injuring. It may often happen that an injury to one person may affect another;

a servant whose master is killed or permanently injured may lose his employment, it may be of long standing, and the misfortune may come when he is of an age when it would be very difficult for him to obtain other work, but no one would suggest that he thereby acquires a right of action against the wrongdoer. Damages for personal injury can seldom be a perfect compensation, but where injury has been caused to a husband or father it has never been the case that his wife or children whose style of living or education may have radically to be curtailed have on that account a right of action other than that which, in the case of death, the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, has given…