relationship between the family and its property is one important focal point for comparison; common law and civil law differ in their approach to matrimonial regimes (cf the notion of dowry: Dig 24.3.1). The French model has a notion of community property (CC, Art 1400, etc) whereas English law sees only two individuals governed by the ordinary law of property (Van den Boogaard v Laumen [1997] 3 WLR 284, pp 292–93). That said, a spouse in UK law may have a real right in the family home, just as a wife did in late Roman law with respect to her dowry (C 8.18.12), and there are statutory rights of occupation (Matrimonial Homes Act 1983). In addition, the law of remedies and the general private law might provide indirect protection of the family (see, for example, Barclays Bank v O’Brien, p 256). Does Jackson indicate that the law of obligations does not recognise the family as a formal institution? What about the law of remedies? 3 The status of individuals (in particular women and children) within the institution of the family is another focal point of comparison (cf Children Act 1989, s 1). What rights does the law of persons give children vis à vis parents and vice versa (cf CC, Arts 371, etc)?
The second element in the institutional scheme after persona is res. This latter term can loosely be translated as ‘thing’—although the Latin word is rather amorphous—and represents another focal point around which legal propositions can be grouped. ‘Things’ (res) act to some extent as a counterpoint to ‘person’ (persona) and thus the law of things cannot be understood divorced
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Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 Court of Appeal

(See p 141.)