chapter  1998
, PUF, pp 15–18). One might also mention, alongside interests, notions such as ‘fault’ and ‘damage’ which are, in theory, merely descriptive. Having said that interest, fault and damage are in theory descriptive, in truth they often play a role that is at once descriptive and normative (Dubouchet, Sémiotique juridique, 1990, PUF, pp 144–45). Thus, to say that D has carelessly caused damage to P is to go far in implying that D ought to compensate P; in other words, the mere juxtaposition of the two descriptive concepts of ‘damage’ and ‘fault can endow them both with a quasi-normative
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Sir Thomas Bingham MR:… Neither statute nor authority in my view precludes the making of an ‘exclusion zone’ order. But that does not mean that such orders should be made at all readily, or without very good reason. There are two interests to be reconciled. One is that of the defendant. His liberty must be respected up to the point at which his conduct infringes, or threatens to infringe, the rights of the plaintiff. No restraint should be placed on him which is not judged to be necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff. But the plaintiff has an interest which the court must be astute to protect. The rule of law requires that those whose rights are infringed should seek the aid of the court, and respect for the legal process can only suffer if those who need protection fail to get it. That, in part at least, is why disobedience to orders of the court has always earned severe

punishment. Respect for the freedom of the aggressor should never lead the court to deny necessary protection to the victim.