has reached a certain level of sophistication. A Roman jurist was able to deduce that one does not lose possession of money one has buried in a place now forgotten: for otherwise one would lose possession of slaves when they wandered out of sight (Dig 41.2.44 pr). Such thinking requires a ‘structure’ whereby both slave and money are conceptualised as a res, thus allowing the structure persona-res to be applied to both situations (see Samuel and Rinkes, Law of Obligations and Legal Remedies, 1996, Cavendish Publishing, pp 4–6). The more that one wants to rely upon the deductive method, the more it has to be accompanied by systematisation of law into ever ‘harder’ models (see Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe, 1995, OUP (trans Weir), pp 239–56, 341–6). As Pédamon has summarised it: the ‘transposition, in the legal domain, to a mode of reasoning which was essentially deductive, applied in a rigorous manner and independently of all consideration drawn from experience or from social life could be labelled mos geometricus; it had important consequences for legal method’ in that it ‘orientated German legal science towards a kind of “conceptual hardening” (Holleaux) which foreshadowed the work of the Pandectic school and which still characterises today, at least in some respects, the German legal spirit’ (Le droit allemand, 1985, PUF, pp 15–16). The BGB was the final result of this modelisation.
Pages 1

Hoffmann LJ:… Mr Longmore’s argument is extremely simple. He says that the question raised on the pleadings is whether the retrocession agreement was void ab initio. The arbitration clause formed part of the retrocession agreement. Therefore the issue must involve the validity of the arbitration clause itself.