ABSTRACT

Designed for students who may not have ready access to a law library, and for students on part-time and distance learning courses, the Sourcebook series offers a collection of material from a diversity of sources. The sources are annotated to set the materials in context and to explain their relevance and importance. This volume contains a representative selection of cases and statutes which cover such topics as the nature of law, sources of law, and the structure and jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts. The legal profession and the interpretation of statutes are also discussed.

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documents into Plain English have shown number benefit it has not been soften attitude

Plain English considerable degrees improvement in comprehension. particularly elaborate experiment conducted Charrows United States. Potential jurors asked paraphrase standard civil instructions. instruction presented tape, played twice, paraphrase requested orally, and taped. instructions rewritten

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United Kingdom, the Renton Committee on the Preparation of Legislation commented: upon

those features described by Danet poetisation-might compromise 'majesty' Bhatia terms genre: after simplification, argues, resulting either obscure or even generic integrity original'. legislation, least, he prefers document solution. final argument which, correct, would affect all

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draftsmen, such that the familiar style is sensed as 'the' right and appropriate one. This tradition is perceived by the non-specialist in very different terms:

shorter sentences linked cross- references. second document solution'. should recognise distinct irreconcilable audiences ...each different background knowledge different motivations reading understanding document. versions, therefore, represent different genres'. should, therefore,

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would not 'interpretation' reasons-

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jurist-but

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popular from-and above-

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particular backgrounds,

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the wishes of the Government expressed in the form of legislation, or the extent to which it can interfere with the pursuit of those wishes. Until now it has been a commonplace of political thought that although the United Kingdom might not have a written constitution its unwritten constitution was nonetheless based on fundamental principles. Amongst these principles were the sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule of Law. The centrality within the United Kingdom constitution of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has traditionally meant that Parliament can make such law as it determines, but the validity of such an interpretation has been questioned by some. The justifications for such challenges to absolute Parliamentary sovereignty are based on the United Kingdom's membership of both the European Union and the Council of Europe with the implications of higher authorities than Parliament, in the former's legislation and the latter's endorsement of inalienable individual rights. As for the Rule of Law, although it is a notoriously amorphous concept, it has provided the courts with scope for challenging the actions of the executive and, indeed, to a more limited degree, the legislature. The mechanism through which the courts have previously exercised their burgeoning constitutional and, by definition, political role is judicial review by means of which they have asserted the right to subject the actions and operations of the executive to the gaze and control of the law in such a way as to prevent the executive from abusing its power. However, such power has been greatly extended by the enactment of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The Act only came into effect in October 2000 so the question remains as to how the courts will use the powers given to them under that Act. The remaining articles in this chapter will consider the wider political context within which the judiciary operate as well as focusing on the Rule of Law and the HRA 1998. In an article 'Law and democracy', published in the Spring 1995 edition of Public Law, Sir John Laws, Justice of the High Court, Queen's Bench Division, considered the appropriate role of judges within the constitution from the perspective of the judge (footnotes omitted).

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Freedom ofexpression

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Supplemental Orders etc under this

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with and

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Remedial Orders may-

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Urgent cases

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Hansard-

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under

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but found-in

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are'compelling

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and appropriate used authority that

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Jwas

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Alternative verdicts murder

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catheter and, if appropriate, to the cannula, and regulation of the infusions, could be carried out by an appropriately skilled nurse or midwife acting in accordance with precise instructions given by the registered medical practitioner. The Royal College of Nursing sought a declaration that the circular was wrong in law. Woolf

declaration, granted department declaration advice involve performance unlawful members college. Court Appeal reversed decision but further appeal House Lords, Lord Wilberforce dissenting, reinstated decision Woolf

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passed-and then-at

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catheter-but act-the

act-done

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ill-owing fluid-and

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and not

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courts-ranging

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The Overriding Objective

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The Glossary

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Time Limits may be Varied by Parties

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about that

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playa

article, Richard Burns, barrister Ropewalk Chambers Nottingham Recorder Midland Oxford Circuit, examines Woolf Reforms sides of Bench.

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network-providing

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warrants-This

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Scope this Part

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must-

must-

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Notice a Part

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vital-

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The Benefits ofADR

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LCD, Review

Consultation Paper Tribunals Under General Supervision Council Tribunals

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Inappropriate cases

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Extent Which Other Parts Apply

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Non-Attendance A Final Hearing

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marriage-'

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lIon

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as illegally obtained evidence is not, ipso facto, automatically rendered inadmissible. The House of Lords ruled in Sang that no discretion existed to exclude evidence simply because it had been illegally or improperly obtained. A court could only exclude relevant evidence where its effect would be 'unduly prejudicial'. This is reflected in s 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 (below). This perhaps surprising rule was supported by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (although the argument there w as chiefly focused on the admissibility of confession evidence). An action for damages for false imprisonment. In some cases the damages for such an action would be likely to be nominal if the violation by the detainer does not have much impact on the detainee. Consider cases under this heading like Christie v Leachinsky. Damages can, however, be considerable. Apart from the question of civil remedies, it is important to remember that, if the arrest is not lawful, there is the right to use reasonable force to resist it. This is a remedy, however, of doubtful advisability as the legality of the arrest will only be properly tested after the event in a law court. If a police officer was engaged in what the courts decide was a lawful arrest or conduct, then anyone who uses force against the officer might have been guilty of an offence of assaulting an officer in the execution of his duty contrary to s of the Police Act 1964. Police Act Section Assaults on constables

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General powers of arrest In Spicer v Holt [1977] AC 987, Lord Dilhorne stated: 'Whether or not a person has been arrested depends not upon the legality of the arrest, but on whether he has been deprived of his liberty to go where he pleases.' So a person who is detained by the police against his will is arrested. Whether this arrest is lawful will depend on whether the conditions for a lawful arrest have been satisfied. If the arrest is not lawful there is the right to use reasonable force to resist it. This is a remedy, however, of doubtful advisability as the legality of the arrest will only properly be tested after the event in a law court. Lawful arrests are those: under warrant; without warrant at common law; or without warrant under legislation. Arrest under warrant The police lay a written information on oath before a magistrate that a person 'has, or is suspected of having, committed an offence' (Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s 1). The Criminal Justice Act 1967 provides that warrants should not be issued unless the offence in question is indictable or is punishable with imprisonment. Common arrests The only power to arrest at common law is where a breach of the peace has been committed and there are reasonable grounds for believing that it will be continued or renewed, or where a breach of the peace is reasonably apprehended. Arrest under legislation The right to arrest is generally governed by s 24 of PACE (as amended by s of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPO) 1994). PACE 1984 Section

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in the powers of arrest in based on whether an being committed: anyone may make the

police respondent daughter taken to the police station, charged, released morning daughter tried charge against respondent consent of court appellants advised insufficient evidence justify prosecution.

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warrant, he should take the arrested person before a justice of the peace or a police officer, not necessarily forthwith, as soon as was reasonably for false imprisonment.

reasonably possible; circumstances, respondent appellants' office obtain authority prosecute unreasonable delay before handing her police; therefore, the appellants liable

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had had a prima facie case for suspicion, but that the arrest was premature. He had defined 'reasonable cause' (which the officers would have needed to show they had when they arrested the plaintiff) as 'honest belief founded upon reasonable suspicion leading an ordinary cautious man to the conclusion that the person arrested was guilty of the offence'. He said an ordinary man would

sought information from suspect, including explanation grudge part. relied Scott [1944] principle every presumed innocent until proved guilty arrests. Court Appeal allowed an appeal Chief Constable. court judge severe a judging officer's conduct.

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Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] WLR 660 House of Lords: A detective constable, exercising his powers under s2(4) of the CLA 1967, arrested the plaintiff on suspicion that she had stolen jewellery and took her to a police station where she was questioned. She was not charged with an offence and was released from detention within six hours of her arrest. The plaintiff bought an action in the county court against the Chief Constable for damages for wrongful arrest. The judge found that the detective constable had had reasonable grounds to suspect the plaintiff of having committed an arrestable offence and that the period of detention was not excessive but, because the constable had decided not to interview her under caution but to subject her to the greater pressure of arrest and detention so as to induce a confession, there had been a wrongful exercise of the power of arrest. The plaintiff was awarded £1,000 damages. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the Chief Constable. On the plaintiffs appeal: Held that the Wednesbury principles were to be applied in determining, for the purpose of founding an action at common law for false imprisonment, whether the discretion conferred upon a constable by s2(4) of the CLA 1967 to arrest a person without a warrant had been exercised lawfully, namely whether the discretion had been exercised in good faith and whether irrelevant matters had been excluded

consideration. applied. [1970] considered. Dismissing appeal, since an arrestable offence committed and constable reasonable cause suspecting plaintiff guilty offence,

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whether any justices-that importance-for

decided by Divisional Court where taken order attention being officer acting lawfully thus, within execution of duty. Police officers course of attaching a 'fixed penalty' notice which was causing an obstruction. owner returned behaved abusively officers,

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no power detain on by in order out but it make stop summary it stands, nothing in which would permit an any

prosecution established stopped, searched and 'consent balanced point, including might provided which

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not This is, thus, a very wide power, and is subject to few restraints. The search could be for virtually anything and it need not be based upon a reasonable suspicion. This power was

given progressively devastating terrorism inability State vehicle stopped under section, whether officer grounds suspecting contains items terrorism. thus, unlike power conferred under which does, valid, require reasonable suspicion vehicle

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on premises, despite being asked by the occupiers to leave, in circumstances where the officers believed that

certain offences (seditious speeches, incitements violence) would committed present. Hewart said:

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At about The appellant demanded the authority the and

attempted search appellant's appellant demanded authority eventually entered appellant's court prosecution contended entry inspector's notebook requirement power entry and under headed 'Search Arrest'. police appellant's sons' arrests, could until hours Although limit, immediate power. would wrong right premises. police wanted could

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Seizure of articles from searches The scope of the seizure rights is, therefore, quite wide and Professor Zander has argued that the insistence, since Entick v Carrington in 1765, that general warrants are unlawful must now be qualified by the knowledge that once the police have entered premises lawfully, it is difficult to hold them to a search restricted to the specific purpose of the search. Entick v Carrington (1765) ER 807, Court of Common Pleas, Lord Camden CJ On 6 November 1762, the Earl of Halifax, one of the principal Secretaries of State, issued a warrant to four King's messengers (Nathan Carrington, James Watson, Thomas Adran and Robert Blackmore), to make strict and diligent search for John Entick, the author, or one concerned in writing of several weekly very seditious papers, entitled the Monitor, or British Free holder...and him, having found you are to seize and apprehend, and to bring, together with his books and papers, in safe custody before me to be examined... '. The messengers entered E's house, the outer door being open, apprehended him, and searched for his books and papers in several rooms and in one bureau, one writing desk and several drawers. Where necessary these were broken open. They seized some books and papers and read others, remaining for about four hours. They then took E and the items seized to Lovel Stanhope, law clerk to the Secretaries of State. E was released on 17 November. He subsequently brought an action in trespass against the messengers. The jury gave a special verdict and assessed the damages at £300. The defendants argued that their acts were done in obedience to a lawful warrant.

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Search warrants and safeguards Section 8 of PACE 1984 provides for the issue of warrants by magistrates to enter and search premises for evidence of serious arrestable offences. This gives justices of the peace the power, on written application from a constable, to issue a search warrant where they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a 'serious arrestable offence' has been 'serious that serious with administration with

committed. arrestable offence' distinct 'arrestable offence' defined by defined by Sched 1984). definition divides offences categories. category comprises offences so serious 'serious arrestable offences'; listed in Sched include treason, murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, incest possession firearms

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Police officers in plain clothes went to the appellant's premises with a warrant to enter and search the premises for drugs. gain entry, a woman police constable, pretending to be delivering flowers, knocked on the door and when the appellant opened it, the police officers entered. One of the officers, who had the warrant in his possession and gave evidence that he had it folded in his hand with his warrant card, shouted 'Police, got a warrant'. The appellant reacted by shouting a warning to a man, who was later found in a room with drugs, and then the appellant pulled a knife from the back of the door and lunged at the officer with it. He was arrested and charged with attempted wounding with intent to resist lawful arrest and with obstructing a constable in the execution of his powers under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The recorder ruled that for the entry and search of the appellant's premises and his subsequent detainer to be lawful it was not necessary for the requirements as to identification and production of the warrant imposed by s 16(5) of PACE 1984 to have been complied with before the police entered the premises and, in her summing up to the jury, she defined 'produce' the warrant in s 16(5)(b), as 'available to be seen'. The appellant was convicted. On appeal against conviction: Held, dismissing the appeal: that s 16(5) of PACE 1984 required the constable to identify himself, to produce the search warrant and to provide the occupier with a copy, but it did not require the constable to fulfil those obligations before entering the premises; that where a search warrant was issued under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the constable had reasonable grounds for believing that delay in entry would frustrate the search, he could, both under s 23(3) of the Act of 1971 and para 5.4 of the Code of Practice, use force or subterfuge to gain entry to the premises before complying with the requirements of s 16(5) of the Act of 1984; and that, accordingly, the police officers' entry into the premises was lawful. That a warrant or warrant card was 'produced' in compliance with s 16(5)(a) and (b) of the Act of 1984 when the occupier was given an opportunity to inspect it; that it was not sufficient that the occupier was merely shown that the officer had a warrant, but the jury could have been in no doubt that before the police officer had time to permit the appellant to inspect the warrant and the warrant card, he had obstructed the police by shouting his warning to the other man in the house and thereby deprived himself of the opportunity to inspect the documents before his arrest.

interpret-ian

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Section 65 of PACE 1984 now defines an intimate search as, ' ... a search which consists of the physical examination of a person's body orifices other than the mouth'. A physical examination of the mouth searches must authorised by rank

therefore allowed circumstances where non-intimate search of person occur, subject ordinary safeguards (Code Practice search of mouth drugs defined by 1984, restrictions which apply apply here. search of an arrested person's mouth may, thus, carried out

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used-(a)

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Notifying the suspect of the right free advice There is clearly the danger that a person's right to legal advice can be effectively curtailed if they are not aware of it. Code C therefore goes to some lengths to ensure the suspect is aware of the right. The custody officer is required (para 3.5) when he authorises a person's detention in the police station to make sure that the suspect signs the custody record signifying whether he wishes to have legal advice at that point. The revised Code adds the following: 'The custody officer is responsible for ensuring that the person signs the custody record in the correct place to give effect to his decision.' The Code stipulates that police stations must advertise the right to free legal advice in posters 'prominently displayed in the charging area of every police station' (para 6.3). New guidance in the 1995 Code states that (6H): 'In addition to a poster in English advertising the right to legal advice, a poster or posters containing translations into Welsh, the main ethnic minority languages and the principal European languages should be displayed wherever they are likely to be helpful and it is practicable to do so.' The Code also gives precise rules concerning at what point and in what form a person should be notified of the right to get free legal advice. For example, a person who comes to the station under arrest must be told immediately both orally and in writing (paras 3.1, 3.2). The revised Code para states:

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coercive questioning (that is, where a suspect's silence can be used in evidence against him or her) can be used in matters under s (as amended) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. There are also wide powers under the Companies Act 1985 to require officers and agents of companies to assist inspectors appointed to investigate the company. Refusal to answer questions can be sanctioned as a contempt of court 431) and as a criminal offence 447). A person can also be required to answer questions to him or her by a acceptances of them under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The closest English law comes to creating a duty to give one's name and address is the power given to the police under s 25(3) of PACE 1984 (above). Effective abolition of the right silence The Government ignored the recommendations of the Runciman Commission and, in ss 34-37 of the CJPO 1994, effectively abolished the right to silence. 'Abolished' may be too strong a word because everyone still has the right to remain silent in the same circumstances as they did before the 1994 Act; what has changed is the entitlement of a judge or prosecuting counsel to make adverse comment on such a silence. The issue has now been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The leading case is Condron v UK [2000] Crim 679. In 2000, two convicted drug dealers won a landmark ruling in Europe that the UK Government's curbs on the right to silence denied them a fair trial. The ECtHR in Strasbourg stated that, where juries are allowed to draw adverse inferences from silence under police questioning, they must be properly directed by the judge. In a key finding, it ruled that the Court of Appeal should look not just at whether a conviction was 'safe', but also at whether a defendant received a fair trial. The ruling will be likely to lead to other appeals. The case, backed by Liberty, the human rights group, was brought by William and Karen Condron, who were convicted of supplying drugs in 1995. The pair, who did not answer police questions, were jailed for four years. The ECtHR said that the jury had not been properly directed. As a result, the couple's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was breached. It awarded each defendant £15,000. Silence could not be regarded as 'an absolute right', the court said, and drawing inferences was not itself in breach of the right to a fair trial, but caution was needed. The jury should have been directed that, ' .. .if it was satisfied that the applicants' silence...could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer, or none that would stand up to cross-examination, it should not draw an adverse inference'. The law report from Times appears below.

liquidator Other powers compel answers on penalties refusal exist under Prevention Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 1989, refusal answer certain allegations prosecutor treated

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following two years across England and Wales (http://tap.ccta.gov.uk/ cps/

infoupdate3). units recommendation Glidewell report 1998. first since service established 1986, Crown prosecutors police together cases reforms return principle police lawyers working process repeated 30,000 cases a year. evidence and witness statements similarly copied and sent off under separate cover. Notifying witnesses would paper, through the post. Technology enable instant updating files investigating officers and lawyers communicating about cases email. Under system, police still retain decision charge.

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if during

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B.-Bail with

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(Amendment) I.-Prosecution right

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introduced

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that when

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Darwin-to what

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a collateral attack is to win in the civil case, proving negligence against the criminal trial lawyer and, thus, by implication, show that the conviction in the criminal case was unfair. Findings Held: the House of Lords held (Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse dissenting in part) that, in the light of modern conditions, it was now clear that it was no longer in the public interest in the administration of justice that advocates should have immunity from suit for negligence for acts concerned with the conduct of either civil or criminal litigation. Lord Hoffmann (with Lord Steyn, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Millett delivering concurring opinions) said that over 30 years had passed since the House had last considered the rationale for the immunity of the advocate from suit, in Randel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191. Public policy was not immutable and there had been great changes in the law of negligence, the functioning of the legal profession, the administration of justice and public perceptions. It was once again time to re-examine the whole matter. Interestingly, Lord Hoffmann chose to formulate his opinion in a creative mode to reflect public policy rather than in the tradition of what can be seen as slavish obedience to the details of precedent: if

There distinct versions divided loyalty argument. first possibility being negligence would actually inhibit lawyer, consciously or unconsciously, giving court priority client. second divided loyalty factor conduct of litigation difficult

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Once the conviction has been set aside, there could be no public policy objection to an action for negligence against the legal advisers. There could be no conflict of judgments. On the other hand, in civil, including matrimonial, cases, it would seldom be possible to say that an action for negligence against a legal adviser or representative would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Whether the original decision was right or wrong was usually a matter of concern only to the parties and had no wider implications. There was no public interest objection to a subsequent finding that, but for the negligence of his lawyers, the losing party would have won. But again there might be exceptions. The action for negligence might be an abuse of process on the ground that it was manifestly unfair to someone else. Take, for example, the case of a defendant who published a serious defamation which he attempted unsuccessfully to justify. Should he be able to sue his lawyers and claim that if the case had been conducted differently, the allegation would have been proved to be true? It seemed unfair to the plaintiff in the defamation action that any court should be allowed to come to such a conclusion in proceedings to which he was not a party. On the other hand, it was equally unfair that he should have to join as a party and rebut the allegation for a second time. A man's reputation was not only a matter between him and the other party. It represented his relationship with the world. So it might be that in such circumstances, an action for negligence would be an abuse of the of the court. Having regard to the power of the court to strike out actions which had no prospect ofsuccess, the doctrine unlikely in that context to be invoked very often. The first step in any application to strike out an action alleging negligence in the conduct of a previous action had to be to ask whether it had a real prospect of success. Lord Hope, Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse delivered judgments in which they agreed that the immunity from suit was no longer required in relation to civil proceedings but dissented to the extent of saying that the immunity was still required in the public interest in the administration of justice in relation to criminal proceedings. Comment This decision is of major and historic importance in the English legal system for several reasons. It can be seen as a bold attempt by the senior judiciary to drag the legal profession (often a metonymy for the whole legal system) into the 21st century world of accountability and fair business practice. In his judgment, Lord Steyn makes this dramatic observation:

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JURY

generally accepted true' heart assumption presence persons, randomly introduced into procedure

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stand

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A further option

principles involved following chapter will, extended judicial bias. establishing question jurors considered, and appropriate questioning decision grounds stated, House Lords

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deployment substantial voted by

other judge should

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In the above speech Lord Irvine makes reference to the fact that the office of Lord Chancellor 'carries significant authority within all three branches of Government'. Such diverse authority raises questions as to its within Human Human but judgment designed support position

appropriateness indeed, its legality under European Convention Rights (ECHR). which Chancellor, European Court Rights (ECtHR) decide issue various roles assumed Bailiff Guernsey, still

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diminishing would not widely

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through