ABSTRACT

Lord Porter: What the common law requires is that, if a man be arrested on suspicion of felony, he should be taken before a tribunal which can deal with his case expeditiously. The question throughout should be: Has the arrestor brought the arrested person to a place where his alleged offence can be dealt with as speedily as is reasonably possible? But all the circumstances in the case must be taken into consideration in deciding whether this requirement is complied with. A direct route and a rapid progress are, no doubt, matters for consideration, but they are not the only matters. Those who arrest must be persuaded of the guilt of the accused; they cannot bolster up their assurance or the strength of the case by seeking further evidence and detaining the man arrested meanwhile or taking him to some spot where they can or may find further evidence. But there are advantages in refusing to give private detectives a free hand and leaving the determination of whether to prosecute or not to a superior official. Whether there is evidence that the steps taken were unreasonable or the delay too great is a matter for the judge. Whether, if there be such evidence, the delay was in fact too great is for the jury: see Cave v Mountain (1840) (1 Man & G 257). In the present case the complaint was, as I have said, not that the detention was too long, but that a direct route from the place of arrest to the magistrate's court had not been taken. In my opinion, that is not the vital question. Rather it is whether, in all the circumstances, the accused person has been brought before a justice of the peace within a reasonable time, it being always remembered that that time should be as short as is reasonably practicable. I would allow the appeal.