Breadcrumbs Section. Click here to navigate to respective pages.
Chapter
Chapter
Figure 4.4: same outcome for different reasons How can these differences be reconciled? There are therefore a range of situations which complicate statements about the bindingness or strength of a given precedent. Lack of agreement among judges in relation to the reasoning process can weaken the precedential value of the case, because judgments in cases can result in different scenarios: For example: (a) the majority of judges agree to dismiss/allow the appeal on one ground. A minority of judges agree with the majority as to outcome, but base their decision on a different ground. In this situation, the ratio of the majority is binding and strong. The ratio of the minority is entitled to weighty consideration in a future case; (b) the majority agree to dismiss/allow the appeal but there is no common ground as to why the appeal has been dismissed or allowed. In this situation, there is no clear majority in favour of any ratio. The case, therefore, lacks authority for the narrowest interpretation of the ratio. But it is impossible to state clearly how such a case is viewed other than to treat it as a weak authority. When there is a strong original ratio that is wide, there is the most scope for later interpretation to mould the law. If, eg, case A has just been decided, the ratio for which the decision is binding being found in the actual opinion of the judge, in later cases (case E) which seek to interpret and apply case A, the judge may have to interpret case A in the light of the new set of facts before him and also interpretations given by subsequent case B, C and D. What seems to happen is that, when a judge is considering Case E currently before the court: (a) the judge states what is considered to be the ratio in the earlier Case A; (b) the judge then considers that ratio in the light of the facts in Case A; (c) the judge also considers the observations made by judges in later Cases B, C and D concerning Case A; (d) ultimately, the judge formulates a rule of law based on a number of cases—the original Case A and Cases B, C and D—and applies this composite reasoning to Case E before the court.
DOI link for Figure 4.4: same outcome for different reasons How can these differences be reconciled? There are therefore a range of situations which complicate statements about the bindingness or strength of a given precedent. Lack of agreement among judges in relation to the reasoning process can weaken the precedential value of the case, because judgments in cases can result in different scenarios: For example: (a) the majority of judges agree to dismiss/allow the appeal on one ground. A minority of judges agree with the majority as to outcome, but base their decision on a different ground. In this situation, the ratio of the majority is binding and strong. The ratio of the minority is entitled to weighty consideration in a future case; (b) the majority agree to dismiss/allow the appeal but there is no common ground as to why the appeal has been dismissed or allowed. In this situation, there is no clear majority in favour of any ratio. The case, therefore, lacks authority for the narrowest interpretation of the ratio. But it is impossible to state clearly how such a case is viewed other than to treat it as a weak authority. When there is a strong original ratio that is wide, there is the most scope for later interpretation to mould the law. If, eg, case A has just been decided, the ratio for which the decision is binding being found in the actual opinion of the judge, in later cases (case E) which seek to interpret and apply case A, the judge may have to interpret case A in the light of the new set of facts before him and also interpretations given by subsequent case B, C and D. What seems to happen is that, when a judge is considering Case E currently before the court: (a) the judge states what is considered to be the ratio in the earlier Case A; (b) the judge then considers that ratio in the light of the facts in Case A; (c) the judge also considers the observations made by judges in later Cases B, C and D concerning Case A; (d) ultimately, the judge formulates a rule of law based on a number of cases—the original Case A and Cases B, C and D—and applies this composite reasoning to Case E before the court.
Figure 4.4: same outcome for different reasons How can these differences be reconciled? There are therefore a range of situations which complicate statements about the bindingness or strength of a given precedent. Lack of agreement among judges in relation to the reasoning process can weaken the precedential value of the case, because judgments in cases can result in different scenarios: For example: (a) the majority of judges agree to dismiss/allow the appeal on one ground. A minority of judges agree with the majority as to outcome, but base their decision on a different ground. In this situation, the ratio of the majority is binding and strong. The ratio of the minority is entitled to weighty consideration in a future case; (b) the majority agree to dismiss/allow the appeal but there is no common ground as to why the appeal has been dismissed or allowed. In this situation, there is no clear majority in favour of any ratio. The case, therefore, lacks authority for the narrowest interpretation of the ratio. But it is impossible to state clearly how such a case is viewed other than to treat it as a weak authority. When there is a strong original ratio that is wide, there is the most scope for later interpretation to mould the law. If, eg, case A has just been decided, the ratio for which the decision is binding being found in the actual opinion of the judge, in later cases (case E) which seek to interpret and apply case A, the judge may have to interpret case A in the light of the new set of facts before him and also interpretations given by subsequent case B, C and D. What seems to happen is that, when a judge is considering Case E currently before the court: (a) the judge states what is considered to be the ratio in the earlier Case A; (b) the judge then considers that ratio in the light of the facts in Case A; (c) the judge also considers the observations made by judges in later Cases B, C and D concerning Case A; (d) ultimately, the judge formulates a rule of law based on a number of cases—the original Case A and Cases B, C and D—and applies this composite reasoning to Case E before the court.
ABSTRACT