ABSTRACT

This book comprises nine papers approaching designed institutions and their interplay with spontaneous institutions from various angles.

While the evolution of spontaneous institutions is quite well understood in economic thinking, the development of consciously designed institutions has been examined much less. In new institutional economics, public choice, and law and economics the interaction between changing preferences and spontaneously evolving institutions on the one hand and the evolution of designed institutions (as, e.g., legal systems) on the other hand has largely been ignored. 

A number of top class international contributors have been assembled to study this phenomenon including Viktor Vanberg, Bruno Frey, Elinor Ostrom and Francesco Parisi.

chapter |2 pages

Introduction

chapter 1|6 pages

Institutional design, social norms and preferences in an evolving economy

ByCHRISTIAN SCHUBERT AND GEORG VON WANGENHEIM

part |2 pages

PART I Designed institutions, preferences and behavior

chapter 3|31 pages

Legislation and countervailing effects from social norms

ByFRANCESCO PARISI AND GEORG VON WANGENHEIM

chapter 4|21 pages

Social motives and institutional design

ByTOM TYLER

part |2 pages

PART II Emergence and change of designed institutions

part |2 pages

Part III Normative perspectives

chapter 8|31 pages

A contractarian view on institutional evolution

ByCHRISTIAN SCHUBERT

chapter 9|17 pages

Probing the welfare prospects of legal competition

ByGERHARD WEGNER

chapter 10|16 pages

Human intentionality and design in cultural evolution

ByVIKTOR J. VANBERG