This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem.

The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn’t it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean?

Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.

chapter |14 pages


ByMichael Schmitz, Gabriele M. Mras

part I|76 pages

Force and Unity

chapter 161|23 pages

Force and Content

ByCharles Travis

chapter 2|17 pages

Force, Mood and the Unity of the Proposition

ByMaria van der Schaar

chapter 3|14 pages

Concept, Truth and the Unity of the Proposition

ByGabriele M. Mras

chapter 4|20 pages

Force, Content and the Varieties of Unity

ByMichael Schmitz

part II|64 pages

Force and Cancellation

chapter 925|19 pages

The Varieties of Cancellation

ByPeter Hanks

chapter 6|24 pages

Entertaining as Simulation

ByFrançois Recanati

chapter 7|19 pages

Force Cancellation and Force Liberation

ByEleni Manolakaki

part III|97 pages

Force, Content, Truth and Satisfaction

chapter 1568|19 pages

Global Expressivism and the Puzzle of Truth-Apt Sentences

ByStephen Barker

chapter 9|19 pages

Preliminaries for a Speech-Act Theory of Imperative Content

ByChristopher Hom, Jeremy Schwartz

chapter 10|20 pages

Force, Content and Translucent Self-Ascriptions

ByMitchell Green

chapter 12|17 pages

Truthmaking, Satisfaction and the Force-Content Distinction

ByFriederike Moltmann