This is the first collection of essays exclusively devoted to knowledge from non-knowledge and related issues. It features original contributions from some of the most prominent and up-and-coming scholars working in contemporary epistemology.

There is a nascent literature in epistemology about the possibility of inferential knowledge based on premises that are, for one reason or another, not known. The essays in this book explore if and how epistemology can accommodate cases where knowledge is generated from something other than knowledge. Can reasoning from false beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from unjustified beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from gettiered beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from propositions one does not even believe generate knowledge? The contributors to this book tackle these and other questions head-on. Together, they advance the debate about knowledge from non-knowledge in novel and interesting directions.

Illuminating Errors will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

Introduction Rodrigo Borges and Ian Schnee  Part 1: The Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge  Section 1: Justification and Essential Falsehoods  1. Norms of Belief and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge E.J. Coffman  2. We Are Justified in Believing that KFK is Fundamentally Wrong Peter D. Klein  3. No Knowledge From Falsity Fred Adams  4. Harmless Falsehoods Martin Montminy  5. Knowledge from Blindspots Rhys Borchert, Juan Comesaña, and Timothy Kearl  Section 2: Gettier, Safety and Defeasibility  6. Knowledge from Error and Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology Duncan Pritchard  7. Epistemic Alchemy? Stephen Hetherington  8. The Benign/Malignant Distinction for False Premises Claudio de Almeida  9. Knowledge, Falsehood, and Defeat Sven Bernecker  Part 2: Beyond the Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge  Section 3: Reasoning, Hinges and Cornerstones  10. The Developmental Psychology of Sherlock Holmes: Counter-Closure Precedes Closure Roy Sorensen  11. Inferential Knowledge, Counter Closure, and Cognition Michael Blome-Tillmann and Brian Ball  12. Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: A Dialogue Michael Veber  13. Vaults Across Reasoning Peter Murphy  14. Entitlement, Leaching and Counter-Closure Federico Luzzi  Section 4: Knowledge: From Falsehoods and of Falsehoods  15. Why is Knowledge from Falsehood Possible? An Explanation John Turri  16. The Assertion Norm of Knowing John Biro  17. Knowledge Without Factivity Kate Nolfi  18. Knowing the Facts, Alternative and Otherwise Clayton Littlejohn