ABSTRACT

This is the first collection of essays exclusively devoted to knowledge from non-knowledge and related issues. It features original contributions from some of the most prominent and up-and-coming scholars working in contemporary epistemology.

There is a nascent literature in epistemology about the possibility of inferential knowledge based on premises that are, for one reason or another, not known. The essays in this book explore if and how epistemology can accommodate cases where knowledge is generated from something other than knowledge. Can reasoning from false beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from unjustified beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from gettiered beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from propositions one does not even believe generate knowledge? The contributors to this book tackle these and other questions head-on. Together, they advance the debate about knowledge from non-knowledge in novel and interesting directions.

Illuminating Errors will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

chapter |8 pages

Introduction

ByRodrigo Borges, Ian Schnee

part I|149 pages

The Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

section Section I|82 pages

Justification and Essential Falsehoods

chapter 1|17 pages

Norms of Belief and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

ByE. J. Coffman

chapter 2|16 pages

We are Justified in Believing that KFK is Fundamentally Wrong

ByPeter D. Klein

chapter 3|15 pages

No Knowledge from Falsity

ByFred Adams

chapter 4|17 pages

Harmless Falsehoods

ByMartin Montminy

chapter 5|16 pages

Knowledge from Blindspots

ByRhys Borchert, Juan Comesaña, Timothy Kearl

section Section II|66 pages

Gettier, Safety, and Defeasibility

chapter 6|11 pages

Knowledge from Error and Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology

ByDuncan Pritchard

chapter 7|16 pages

Epistemic Alchemy?

ByStephen Hetherington

chapter 8|19 pages

The Benign/Malignant Distinction for False Premises

ByClaudio de Almeida

chapter 9|19 pages

Knowledge, Falsehood, and Defeat

BySven Bernecker

part II|170 pages

Beyond the Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

section Section III|97 pages

Reasoning, Hinges, and Cornerstones

chapter 10|22 pages

The Developmental Psychology of Sherlock Holmes

Counter-Closure Precedes Closure
ByRoy Sorensen

chapter 11|13 pages

Inferential Knowledge, Counter Closure, and Cognition

ByMichael Blome-Tillmann, Brian Ball

chapter 12|19 pages

Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Wittgenstein's On Certainty

A Dialogue
ByMichael Veber

chapter 13|16 pages

Vaults across Reasoning

ByPeter Murphy

chapter 14|26 pages

Entitlement, Leaching, and Counter-Closure

ByFederico Luzzi

section Section IV|72 pages

Knowledge: From Falsehoods and of Falsehoods

chapter 15|15 pages

Why Is Knowledge from Falsehood Possible?

An Explanation
ByJohn Turri

chapter 16|13 pages

The Assertion Norm of Knowing

ByJohn Biro

chapter 17|26 pages

Knowledge without Factivity

ByKate Nolfi

chapter 18|17 pages

Knowing the Facts, Alternative and Otherwise

ByClayton Littlejohn