This book offers a sustained, interdisciplinary examination of taste. It addresses a range of topics that have been at the heart of lively debates in philosophy of language, linguistics, metaphysics, aesthetics, and experimental philosophy.

Our everyday lives are suffused with discussions about taste. We are quick to offer familiar platitudes about taste, but we struggle when facing the questions that matter—what taste is, how it is related to subjectivity, what distinguishes good from bad taste, why it is valuable to make and evaluate judgments about matters of taste, and what, exactly, we mean in speaking about these matters. The essays in this volume open up new, intersecting lines of research about these questions that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. They address the notion of aesthetic taste; connections between taste and the natures of truth, disagreement, assertion, belief, retraction, linguistic context-sensitivity, and the semantics/pragmatics interface; experimental inquiry about taste; and metaphysical questions underlying ongoing discussions about taste.

Perspectives on Taste will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in aesthetics, philosophy of language, linguistics, metaphysics, and experimental philosophy.

chapter 1|16 pages


part I|58 pages


chapter 2|21 pages

The Trajectory of Gustatory Taste

chapter 4|17 pages

Aesthetic Taste

Perceptual Discernment or Emotional Sensibility?

part II|66 pages

Experimental Philosophy

chapter 5|32 pages

De Gustibus Est Disputandum

An Empirical Investigation of the Folk Concept of Aesthetic Taste

chapter 6|32 pages

Contextualism Versus Relativism

More Empirical Data

part III|49 pages


chapter 8|27 pages

How to Canberra-Plan Disagreement

Platitudes, Taste, Preferences

part IV|151 pages

Philosophy of Language and Linguistics

chapter 12|26 pages

Differences of Taste

An Investigation of Phenomenal and Non-Phenomenal Appearance Sentences

chapter 13|33 pages

Individual- and Stage-Level Predicates of Personal Taste

Another Argument for Genericity as the Source of Faultless Disagreement