Inferentialism is a philosophical approach premised on the claim that an item of language (or thought) acquires meaning (or content) in virtue of being embedded in an intricate set of social practices normatively governed by inferential rules. Inferentialism found its paradigmatic formulation in Robert Brandom’s landmark book Making it Explicit, and over the last two decades it has established itself as one of the leading research programs in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of logic. While Brandom’s version of inferentialism has received wide attention in the philosophical literature, thinkers friendly to inferentialism have proposed and developed new lines of inquiry that merit wider recognition and critical appraisal.

From Rules to Meaning brings together new essays that systematically develop, compare, assess and critically react to some of the most pertinent recent trends in inferentialism. The book’s four thematic sections seek to apply inferentialism to a number of core issues, including the nature of meaning and content, reconstructing semantics, rule-oriented models and explanations of social practices and inferentialism’s historical influence and dialogue with other philosophical traditions. With contributions from a number of distinguished philosophers—including Robert Brandom and Jaroslav Peregrin—this volume is a major contribution to the philosophical literature on the foundations of logic and language.

chapter |45 pages


Inferentialism’s Years of Travel and Its Logico-Philosophical Calling
ByLadislav Koreň, Vojtěch Kolman

part 47I|66 pages

Language and Meaning

chapter 1|14 pages

Grounding Assertion and Acceptance in Mental Imagery

ByChristopher Gauker

chapter 2|18 pages


Why Rules Ought to Matter
ByHans-Johann Glock

chapter 3|16 pages

Quine Peregrinating

Norms, Dispositions, and Analyticity
ByGary Kemp

chapter 4|16 pages

Let’s Admit Defeat

Assertion, Denial, and Retraction
ByBernhard Weiss

part 113II|124 pages

Logic and Semantics

chapter 5|26 pages

Inferentialism, Structure, and Conservativeness

ByOle Hjortland, Shawn Standefer

chapter 6|14 pages

From Logical Expressivism to Expressivist Logics

Sketch of a Program and Some Implementations
ByRobert Brandom

chapter 7|24 pages

Inferentialist-Expressivism for Explanatory Vocabulary

ByJared Millson, Kareem Khalifa, Mark Risjord

chapter 8|17 pages

Logical Expressivism and Logical Relations

ByLionel Shapiro

chapter 9|23 pages

Propositional Contents and the Logical Space

ByLadislav Koreň

chapter 10|18 pages

Assertion, Inference, and the Conditional

ByPeter Milne

part 237III|56 pages

Rules, Agency, and Explanation

chapter 11|10 pages

Naturecultural Inferentialism

ByJoseph Rouse

chapter 12|12 pages


Where Do We Go from Here?
ByJaroslav Peregrin

chapter 13|17 pages

The Nature and Diversity of Rules

ByVladimír Svoboda

chapter 14|15 pages

Governed by Rules, or Subject to Rules?

ByOndřej Beran

part 293IV|54 pages

History and Present

chapter 15|13 pages

Inferentialism after Kant

ByDanielle Macbeth

chapter 16|15 pages

Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Ought-to-Bes of Perceptual Cognition

ByJames R. O’Shea

chapter 17|11 pages

Inferentialism and Its Mathematical Precursor

ByVojtěch Kolman

chapter 18|13 pages

Inferentialism and the Reception of Testimony

ByLeila Haaparanta