ABSTRACT

International environmental agreements provide a basis for countries to address ecological problems on a global scale. However, countries are heterogeneous with respect to their economic structures and to the problems relating to the environment that they encounter. Therefore, economic externalities and global environmental conflicts are common and can cause problems in implementation and compliance with international agreements.

Economics of International Environmental Agreements illuminates those issues and factors that might cause some countries or firms to take different positions on common problems. This book explores why international environmental agreements deal with some problems successfully but fail with others. The chapters address issues that are global in nature, such as: transboundary pollution, provision of global public goods, individual preferences of inequality- aversion, global cooperation, self-enforcing international environmental agreements, emission standards, abatement costs, environmental quota, technology agreement and adoption and international institutions. They examine the necessary conditions for the improved performance of international environmental agreements, how cooperation among countries can be improved and the incentives that can be created for voluntary compliance with international environmental agreements.

This text is of great importance to academics, students and policy makers who are interested in environmental economics, policy and politics, as well as environmental law.

chapter |12 pages

Introduction

ByM. Özgür Kayalıca, Selim Çağatay, Hakan Mıhçı

part 1|22 pages

Stability

chapter 1|20 pages

What drives compliance with international environmental agreements?

A political economy analysis of international and national determinants
BySarah Al Doyaili-Wangler, Leo Wangler

chapter 2|26 pages

Stable environmental agreements and international trade in asymmetric oligopoly markets

ByMichel Cavagnac, Guillaume Cheikbossian

chapter 3|15 pages

The effects of inequality aversion on the formation of climate coalition

Theory and experimental evidence
ByYu-Hsuan Lin

part 2|20 pages

Heterogeneous countries

chapter 4|18 pages

Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors

ByAchim Hagen, Leonhard Kähler, Klaus Eisenack

chapter 5|19 pages

International trade and environmental cooperation among heterogeneous countries

BySoham Baksi, Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

part 3|12 pages

Firm heterogeneity

chapter 7|10 pages

Foreign penetration and environmental policies

BySajal Lahiri, Yingyi Tsai

chapter 9|20 pages

Environmental quota in an asymmetric trade competition with heterogeneous firms

ByRafael Salvador Espinosa Ramírez, M. Özgür Kayalıca

part 4|19 pages

Environmental technology

chapter 10|17 pages

The effectiveness of international technology agreements for environmental issues

The impacts of R&D costs
ByChisa Kajita, Toshiyuki Fujita

chapter 11|25 pages

Adaptation technology and free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements 1

ByHassan Benchekroun, Walid Marrouch, Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

chapter 12|14 pages

Cooperation in environmental standards when abatement technology differs

ByMerve Kumaş, M. Özgür Kayalıca, Gülgün Kayakutlu

part 5|19 pages

International institutions

chapter 13|17 pages

Challenges of governing international energy transitions

International Renewable Energy Agency as a solution?
ByYasemin Atalay

chapter 14|16 pages

Carbon dioxide emissions in the carbon cycle frame

What will the future look like?
ByOnur Tutulmaz, Selim Çağatay

chapter |9 pages

Concluding remarks

ByM. Özgür Kayalıca, Selim Çağatay, Hakan Mıhçı