Moral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical inquiry. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, the debates between moral skeptics of various stripes and their opponents have gained renewed force not only by taking account of innovative ideas in moral philosophy, but also by drawing on novel positions in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language as well as on recent findings in empirical sciences. As a result, new arguments for and against moral skepticism have been devised, while the traditional ones have been reexamined. This collection of original essays will advance the ongoing debates about various forms of moral skepticism by discussing such topics as error theory, disagreement, constructivism, non-naturalism, expressivism, fictionalism, and evolutionary debunking arguments. It will be a valuable resource for academics and advanced students working in metaethics and moral philosophy more generally.

chapter 1|31 pages

Moral Skepticism

An Introduction and Overview
ByDiego E. Machuca

chapter 2|15 pages

Projection, Indeterminacy and Moral Skepticism

ByHallvard Lillehammer

chapter 3|21 pages

Error Theory, Relaxation and Inferentialism

ByChristine Tiefensee

chapter 4|20 pages

Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory

ByBart Streumer

chapter 5|24 pages

Are There Substantive Moral Conceptual Truths?

ByDavid Copp

chapter 6|26 pages

The Phenomenology of Moral Authority

ByTerry Horgan, Mark Timmons

chapter 7|22 pages

Arguments From Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism

ByRichard Joyce

chapter 8|19 pages

Evolutionary Debunking, Realism and Anthropocentric Metasemantics

ByMark van Roojen

chapter 9|15 pages

Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge

ByFolke Tersman

chapter 10|14 pages

Veneer Theory

ByAaron Zimmerman

chapter 11|22 pages

Moral Skepticism, Fictionalism, and Insulation

ByDiego E. Machuca