Phenomenological accounts of sociality in Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Scheler, Schütz, Stein and many others offer powerful lines of arguments to recast current, predominantly analytic, discussions on collective intentionality and social cognition. Against this background, the aim of this volume is to reevaluate, critically and in contemporary terms, the rich phenomenological resources regarding social reality: the interpersonal, collective and communal aspects of the life-world (Lebenswelt). Specifically, the book pursues three interrelated objectives: it aims 1.) to systematically explore the key phenomenological aspects of social reality; 2.) to offer novel, state-of-the-art assessments of both central and lesser-known proponents of the phenomenology of sociality (Gurwitsch, Löwith, von Hildebrand, or Walther), and 3.) to contextualize this elaborate body of work in light of contemporary social cognition research, the growing literature in analytic social ontology, and current trends in moral psychology, moral phenomenology, and social and political philosophy. The collection brings together original articles by a host of prominent scholars and upcoming young talents to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of the topic. It will be essential reading for those studying phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, empathy, and community, including analytic, social, moral and political philosophers, and will also be of interest for social scientists and social psychologists.

part I|64 pages

Historical and Methodological Issues

chapter 1|13 pages

Locating Shared Life in the ‘Thou'

Some Historical and Thematic Considerations

chapter 3|14 pages

Habermas and Hermeneutics

From Verstehen to Lebenswelt

chapter 4|21 pages

Second-Person Phenomenology

part II|50 pages

Intersubjectivity, the “We-World,” and Objectivity

chapter 5|14 pages

Concrete Interpersonal Encounters or Sharing a Common World

Which Is More Fundamental in Phenomenological Approaches to Sociality?

chapter 6|20 pages

Ineinandersein and L'interlacs

The Constitution of the Social World or “We-World” (Wir-Welt) in Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty

part III|76 pages

Social Cognition, Embodiment, and Social Emotions

chapter 8|16 pages

From Types to Tokens

Empathy and Typification

chapter 9|14 pages

An Interactionist Approach to Shared Cognition

Some Prospects and Challenges

chapter 10|14 pages

“If I had to live like you, I think I'd kill myself”

Social Dimensions of the Experience of Illness

chapter 11|15 pages

Shame as a Fellow Feeling

chapter 12|15 pages

Relating to the Dead

Social Cognition and the Phenomenology of Grief

part IV|62 pages

Collective Intentionality and Affectivity

chapter 13|15 pages

Affective Intentionality

Early Phenomenological Contributions to a New Phenomenological Sociology

chapter 16|16 pages

The Affective ‘We'

Self-Regulation and Shared Emotions

part V|48 pages

Collective Agency and Group Personhood

chapter 17|15 pages

Husserl on Groupings

Social Ontology and the Phenomenology of We-Intentionality

chapter 18|17 pages

Collectivizing Persons and Personifying Collectives

Reassessing Scheler on Group Personhood

chapter 19|14 pages

Brothers in Arms

Fraternity-Terror in Sartre's Social Ontology