A major reassessment of a key aspect of British strategy and defence policy in the first half of the twentieth century.

The main contribution of this new study is an investigation of the role of Malta in British military strategy, as planned and as it actually developed, in the period between the mid 1920s and the end of the war in North Africa in May 1943. It demonstrates that the now widely accepted belief that Malta was 'written off as indefensible' before the war was mistaken, and focuses on Malta's actual wartime role in the Mediterranean war, assessing the numerous advantages, many often ignored, that the British derived from retention of the island. The conclusions made challenge recent assertions that Malta's contribution was of limited value and will be of great interest to both students and professionals in the field.

chapter |5 pages


chapter 1|12 pages

The Base at Malta in the 1920s

chapter 3|13 pages

Malta in the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935–36

chapter 4|14 pages

Prelude to War, 1936–39

chapter 5|11 pages

Final Preparations for War

chapter 6|13 pages

The Threat of Invasion

chapter 7|14 pages

The Initial Onslaught

chapter 9|18 pages

Malta’s Contribution to ‘Crusader’

chapter 10|14 pages

The 1942 Siege of Malta

chapter 12|9 pages