ABSTRACT

This essential new volume reviews the threat perceptions, military doctrines, and war plans of both the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, as well as the position of the neutrals, from the post-Cold War perspective.

Based on previously unknown archival evidence from both East and West, the twelve essays in the book focus on the potential European battlefield rather than the strategic competition between the superpowers. They present conclusions about the nature of the Soviet threat that could previously only be speculated about and analyze the interaction between military matters and politics in the alliance management on both sides, with implications for the present crisis of the Western alliance.

This new book will be of much interest for students of the Cold War, strategic history and international relations history, as well as all military colleges.

chapter |11 pages

Introduction

New perspectives on the Cold War alliances

part |150 pages

Part I Threat perceptions and war planning

chapter |31 pages

1 Imagining war in Europe

Soviet strategic planning

chapter |26 pages

2 Storming on to Paris

The 1961 Buria exercise and the planned solution of the Berlin crisis

chapter |23 pages

3 War plans from Stalin to Brezhnev

The Czechoslovak pivot

chapter |23 pages

4 The Warsaw Pact's special target

Planning the seizure of Denmark

chapter |23 pages

5 “Is this the best they can do?”

Henry Kissinger and the US quest for limited nuclear options, 1969–75

chapter |22 pages

6 Silent allies and hostile neutrals

Nonaligned states in the Cold War

part |138 pages

Part II The politics of alliance management