ABSTRACT

The research literature on causal attribution and social cognition generally consists of many fascinating but fragmented and superficial phenomena. These can only be understood as an organised whole by elucidating the fundamental psychological assumptions on which they depend. Psychological Metaphysics is an exploration of the most basic and important assumptions in the psychological construction of reality, with the aim of showing what they are, how they originate, and what they are there for. Peter White proposes that people basically understand causation in terms of stable, special powers of things operating to produce effects under suitable conditions. This underpins an analysis of people's understanding of causal processes in the physical world, and of human action. In making a radical break with the Heiderian tradition, Psychological Metaphysics suggests that causal attribution is in the service of the person's practical concerns and any interest in accuracy or understanding is subservient to this. Indeed, a notion of regularity in the world is of no more than minor importance, and social cognition is not a matter of cognitive mechanisms or processes but of cultural ways of thinking imposed upon tacit, unquestioned, universal assumptions.

chapter 1|10 pages

Introduction to psychological metaphysics

part |2 pages

Part 1 General psychological metaphysics

chapter 2|10 pages

Practical concerns and lay judgement

chapter 4|13 pages

Foundations

Basic categories and basic particulars

part |2 pages

Part 2 Psychological metaphysics of the physical world

part |2 pages

Part 3 Psychological metaphysics of the mind

chapter 11|26 pages

The concept of action

chapter 12|28 pages

Formation of beliefs about the mind

chapter 14|17 pages

The battleground of the mind

chapter 15|18 pages

Judgement and feelings