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      Book

      Believing Against the Evidence
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      Book

      Believing Against the Evidence

      DOI link for Believing Against the Evidence

      Believing Against the Evidence book

      Agency and the Ethics of Belief

      Believing Against the Evidence

      DOI link for Believing Against the Evidence

      Believing Against the Evidence book

      Agency and the Ethics of Belief
      ByMiriam Schleifer McCormick
      Edition 1st Edition
      First Published 2014
      eBook Published 25 November 2014
      Pub. Location New York
      Imprint Routledge
      DOI https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203579146
      Pages 158
      eBook ISBN 9780203579145
      Subjects Humanities
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      McCormick, M.S. (2014). Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203579146

      ABSTRACT

      The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism.

      In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief.

      TABLE OF CONTENTS

      chapter |12 pages

      Introduction

      part |2 pages

      PART I Doxastic Norms

      chapter 1|22 pages

      Conceptual Defenses of Evidentialism

      chapter 2|15 pages

      Normative Defenses of Evidentialism

      chapter 3|23 pages

      Unity of Norms: A Defense of Pragmatism

      part |2 pages

      PART II Doxastic Responsibility

      chapter 4|14 pages

      The Puzzle of Doxastic Responsibility

      chapter 5|17 pages

      Responsibility without Voluntary Control

      chapter 6|21 pages

      The Possibility of Doxastic Agency

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