ABSTRACT
Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
part 1|64 pages
The Limits of Materialism
part 2|57 pages
Dualism and Empirical Research
part 3|51 pages
Cartesian (Substance) Dualism
part 4|77 pages
Non-Cartesian Dualism