This book offers a concise exposition of the content theory of intentionality, which lies at the root of Husserl’s phenomenology, for student and scholar. Originally published in 1982.

The first part traces the history of phenomenology from its beginnings in Aristotle and Aquinas through Hume, Reid and the Brentano school to its first clear formulation in Frege and Husserl.

Part two analyses some special problems involved in two important types of mental phenomena – perception and emotion – without abandoning the historical approach. Husserl’s theory of perception is extensively discussed and a Husserlian analysis of so-called de re acts is attempted.

chapter 1|10 pages


chapter 2|7 pages

Intentionality from Aristotle to Ockham

chapter 3|9 pages

Empiricism and its Critics

chapter 4|15 pages

Brentano and the Revival of Intentionality

chapter 5|9 pages

Twardowski's Object Theory

chapter 6|9 pages

Meinong's Object Theory

chapter 7|10 pages

Content Theory: Frege and Husserl

chapter 8|7 pages

Summary and Conclusions

part |2 pages

Part Two Some Special Topics

chapter 9|10 pages

The Intentionality of Perception

chapter 10|11 pages

Adumbration and Horizon

chapter 11|13 pages

The Problem of De Re Acts

chapter 12|10 pages

The Intentionality of Emotions