Originally published in 1985. This study concerns the problem of treating identity as a relation between an object and itself. It addresses the Russellian and Fregean solutions and goes on to present in the first part a surfacist account of belief-context ambiguity requiring neither differences in relative scope nor distinctions between sense and reference. The second part offers an account of negative existentials, necessity and identity-statements which resolves problems unlike the Russell-Frege analyses. This is a detailed work in linguistics and philosophy.

Abstract of the Dissertation.  Part 1  The problem 1. The Singular Term: An Ambiguous Name 2. Logically Distinct Does Not Mean Logically Independent 3. Belief-context Ambiguity 4. Conclusion  Part 2  The Reference Theory of Meaning 5. The Picture Theory of Language 6. Particular Facts 7. General Facts 8. General Propositions and Propositional Functions 9. The Puzzles 10. Singular Sentences and Particular Propositions 11. Particular Propositions and General Propositions 12. The Particular 13. The Identity-relation