This book develops a new approach to naturalizing phenomenology. The author proposes to integrate phenomenology with the mechanistic framework that offers new methodological perspectives for studying complex mental phenomena such as consciousness.

While mechanistic explanatory models are widely applied in cognitive science, their approach to describing subjective phenomena is limited. The author argues that phenomenology can fill this gap. He proposes two novel ways of integrating phenomenology and mechanism. First, he presents a new reading of phenomenological analyses as functional analyses. Such functional phenomenology delivers a functional sketch of a target system and provides constraints on the space of possible mechanisms. Second, he develops the neurophenomenological approach in the direction of dynamic modeling of experience. He shows that neurophenomenology can deliver dynamical constraints on mechanistic models and thus inform the search for an underlying mechanism.

Mechanisms and Consciousness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences.

chapter |9 pages


part I|125 pages

Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science

chapter 1|29 pages

The Concept of Phenomenology

chapter 2|30 pages

Naturalizing Phenomenology Reconsidered

chapter 3|64 pages

Models of Explanation in Cognitive Science

part II|64 pages

Phenomenology and Mechanism

chapter 4|28 pages

Phenomenology and Functionalism

chapter 5|26 pages

Phenomenology and Dynamical Modeling

chapter 6|8 pages


Toward Methodologically Guided Mutual Constraints