This book is concerned with the conditions under which epistemic reasons provide justification for beliefs. The author draws on metaethical theories of reasons and normativity and then applies his theory to various contemporary debates in epistemology.

In the first part of the book, the author outlines what he calls the dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. The author offers and defends a dispositional account of how propositional and doxastic justification are related to one another. He then argues that the dispositional view has the resources to provide an acceptable account of the notion of the basing relation. In the second part of the book, the author examines how his theory of epistemic reasons bears on the issues involving perceptual reasons. He defends dogmatism about perceptual justification against conservatism and shows how his dispositional framework illuminates certain claims of dogmatism and its adherence to justification internalism. Finally, the author applies his dispositional framework to epistemological topics including the structure of defeat, self-knowledge, reasoning, emotions and motivational internalism.

The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons demonstrates the value of employing metaethical considerations for the justification of beliefs and propositions. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology and metaethics.

chapter |9 pages


part Part I|70 pages

The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons

chapter 1|22 pages

Possessing Reasons

A Dispositional Framework

part Part II|74 pages

Perceptual Reasons

chapter 6|26 pages


The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons

part Part III|74 pages


chapter 8|13 pages

The Nature of Inference

chapter 9|14 pages

The Epistemic Value of Emotions

chapter 11|14 pages


The Epistemic Significance of the Transparency Procedure