## ABSTRACT

People tend to rank values of all kinds linearly from good to bad, but there is little reason to think that this is reasonable or correct. This book argues, to the contrary, that values are often partially ordered and hence frequently incomparable.

Proceeding logically from a small set of axioms, John Nolt examines the great variety of partially ordered value structures, exposing fallacies that arise from overlooking them. He reveals various ways in which incomparability is obscured: using linear indices to summarize partially ordered data, relying on an inadequately defined concept of parity, or conflating incomparability with vagueness. Incomparability can enrich and clarify a range of topics including the paradoxes of Derek Parfit, rational decision theory, and the infinite values of theology. Finally, Nolt shows how to generalize many of the concepts introduced earlier, explores the intricate depths of certain noteworthy partially ordered value structures, and argues for the finitude of value.

*Incomparable Values* will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, value theory, rational decision theory, and logic.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

part I|48 pages

Preliminaries

part II|168 pages

Basic Formal Axiology

part III|86 pages

Ethical Decision Theory

part IV|141 pages

Bounds