Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior, first published in 1982, examines the question: for what purposes and under what conditions were Soviet leaders prepared to take risks in international relations? The first part of the book sets out to define the concept of risk and to examine its analytical relevance for foreign policy, its measurement and its relation to the dynamics of crisis. The second part consists of in-depth analysis of Soviet behavior in the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961. The third and last part compares Soviet policy in the two crises, and the actions of the two different leaderships, as well as relating it to Soviet behavior in other geographical areas.

chapter |6 pages


part One|58 pages


chapter 1|7 pages

Risk and Risk-Taking

chapter 2|12 pages

A Chess Game Named Disaster

chapter 3|14 pages

Pandora's Marble Pot

part Two|248 pages

Case Studies

chapter 6|11 pages

Interpretations, Ambiguities and Questions

The Berlin Crisis of 1948

chapter 8|50 pages

Factors of Risk-Taking

chapter 9|11 pages

Process Analysis

chapter 10|10 pages

Consequences, Conclusions and Lessons

chapter 11|14 pages

Interpretations, Ambiguities and Questions

The Berlin Crisis of 1961

chapter 13|64 pages

Factors of Risk-Taking

chapter 14|15 pages

Process Analysis

chapter 15|14 pages

Consequences, Conclusions and Lessons

part Three|35 pages

Comparisons and Conclusions