ABSTRACT

This book explains why British defence policy and practice emerged as it did in the period 1941-67, by looking at the overlapping of colonial, military, economic and Cold War factors in the area. Its main focus is on the 1950s and the decolonisation era, but it argues that the plans and conditions of this period can only be understood by tracing them back to their origins in the fall of Singapore. Also, it shows how decolonisation was shaped not just by British aims, but by the way communism, communalism and nationalism facilitated and frustrated these.

chapter |12 pages

Introduction

chapter Chapter One|22 pages

Frameworks

chapter Chapter Two|21 pages

1942 and the ‘Lessons' of Singapore 1

chapter Chapter Three|51 pages

Regional Ambitions and Limited Resources (1945–54)

Defending Southeast Asia

chapter Chapter Four|59 pages

A Bottomless Pit? Forces and Bases (1945–54)

chapter Chapter Five|26 pages

1954 and Continuity in the Face of Change

Dien Bien Phu to SEATO

chapter Chapter Six|28 pages

SEATO and Regional Policy (1954–57)

Atom Bombs and Human Ants

chapter Chapter Seven|39 pages

Merdeka and Bases (1954–57)

chapter Chapter Eight|13 pages

Merdeka and Forces (1954–57)

From ‘East of India' to East of Suez

chapter Chapter Nine|27 pages

Epilogue: From Malayan Independence to British Withdrawal