ABSTRACT
Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
part 1|39 pages
The US Civil War
part 2|100 pages
The First World War
chapter 5|64 pages
Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcment
Allenby's Campaigns in Palestine
part 3|228 pages
The Second World War
chapter 6|16 pages
Flawed Perception And Its Effect Upon Operational Thinking
The Case of the Japanese Army, 1937–41
chapter 12|21 pages
Intelligence and Strategy
Some Observations on the War in the Mediterranean 1941–45
