ABSTRACT

These two volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez.
The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources.

chapter |7 pages

Historical and Psychological Context

part |2 pages

The Israelis likewise sought to make the status quo untenable for

chapter II|13 pages

and Mediation, 1948

chapter |19 pages

Lausanne Conference: Prenegotiation

chapter V|25 pages

Manoeuvring at Lausanne

It was

chapter VI|17 pages

Lausanne: The Final Stalemate

chapter |9 pages

The State

chapter 7|9 pages

Geneva Interlude

chapter |4 pages

Dr Malik replied to McGhee's suggestion

chapter 8|3 pages

Deterioration of the Armistice

chapter |3 pages

.... who have become spokesmen of the

part 10|1 pages

The Paris Conference and the Demise of PCC Mediation

part |2 pages

Conclusion

chapter |14 pages

talks,January-July 1950

chapter |6 pages

PCC-

chapter |22 pages

Documents