Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), along with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, was instrumental in restoring metaphysics to the study of philosophy. Unlike his contemporaries, however, Hartmann was clearly influenced by Plato. His tour-de-force, Ethik, published in English in 1932 as Ethics, may be the most outstanding work on moral philosophy produced in the twentieth century.In the first part of Ethics (Moral Phenomena), Hartmann was concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena, and criticized utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. In the second part, Moral Values, the author describes all values as forming a complex and as yet imperfectly known system. The actualization of the non-moral and elementary moral values is a necessary condition for the actualization of the higher values. It is on this account that rudimentary values have a prior claim.Hartmann outlines the main features of the chief virtues, and shows that the moral disposition required in any exigency is always a specific synthesis of various and often conflicting values. Specifically describing fundamental moral values-such as goodness, nobility, and vitality-and special moral values-such as justice, wisdom, courage, self-control, trustworthiness, and modesty-Hartmann takes theoretical philosophy and brings it very much into the realm of the practical.A compelling and insightful volume, Moral Values remains an essential contribution to the moral and ethical literature of the twentieth century. Hartmann offers a self-contained system of ethics that yet offers a conservative outlook on social life.

part I|52 pages

General Aspects of the Table Of Values

chapter I (xxvi) 1|7 pages

The Place of Moral Values Among Values in General

chapter II|14 pages

Moral Value and the End of Action

chapter III xxviii|10 pages

The Gradation of Values

chapter IV|11 pages

The Criteria of the Grade of a Value

chapter V|8 pages

The Problem of the Supreme Value

part II|50 pages

The Most General Antitheses

chapter VI|6 pages

The Antinomic of Values

chapter VII|6 pages

Modal Oppositions

chapter VIII|11 pages

Relational Opposites

chapter IX|25 pages

Qualitative and Quantitative Oppositions

part III|42 pages

The Values Which Condition Contents

chapter X|6 pages

General Character of The Group

chapter XI|24 pages

Valuational Foundations in the Subject

chapter XII|10 pages

Goods as Values

part IV|58 pages

Fundamental Moral Values

chapter XIII|4 pages

Moral Values in General

chapter XIV|21 pages

The Good

chapter XV|13 pages

The Noble

chapter XVI|6 pages

Richness of Experience

chapter XVII|12 pages


part 5|42 pages

Special Moral Values (First Group)

chapter XVIII|3 pages

The Virtues in General

chapter XIX|10 pages


chapter XX|7 pages


chapter XXI|4 pages


chapter XXII|4 pages


chapter XXIII|12 pages

The Aristotelian Virtues

part VI|44 pages

Special Moral Values (Second Group)

chapter XXIV|14 pages

Brotherly Love

chapter XXV|5 pages

Truthfulness and Uprightness

chapter XXVI|5 pages

Trustworthiness and Fidelity

chapter XXVII|7 pages

Trust and Faith

chapter XXVIII|6 pages

Modesty, Humility, Aloofness

chapter XXIX|5 pages

The Values of Social Intercourse

part VII|73 pages

Special Moral Values (Third Group)

chapter XXX|21 pages

Love of The Remote

chapter XXXI|9 pages

Radiant Virtue

chapter XXXII|27 pages


chapter XXXIII|15 pages

Personal Love

part VIII|90 pages

The Order of the Realm of Values

chapter XXXIV|7 pages

The Lack of Systematic Structure

chapter XXXV|15 pages

Stratification and the Foundational Relation

chapter XXXVII|11 pages

The Complementary Relationship

chapter XXXVIII|20 pages

The Grade and the Strength of Values

chapter XXXIX|9 pages

Value and Valuational Indifference