ABSTRACT
Leading global experts in the field of politics and mathematics bring forth key insights on how voting power should be allocated between EU member states, and what the policy consequences are of any given institutional design. Close attention is paid to the practical implications of decision-making rules, the nature and distribution of power, and the most equitable ways to represent the preoccupations of European citizens both in the Council and European Parliament. Highly theoretical and methodologically advanced, this volume is set to enrich the debate on the future of the EU's institutional design. A valuable source of information to scholars of political science, European studies and law, as well as to people working on game theory, theory of voting and, in general, applications of mathematics to social science.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
part I|91 pages
Voting System for the Council of European Union
chapter 2|8 pages
Penrose's Square-Root Rule and the EU Council of Ministers
chapter 4|16 pages
The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union
part II|103 pages
Distribution of Power in the European Union
chapter 10|10 pages
On the Relative Unimportance of Voting Weights
chapter 11|20 pages
Patterns of Voting in the Council of Ministers of the European Union
chapter 12|12 pages
Decision-Making in the EU Council after the First Eastern Enlargement
part III|79 pages
Allocation of Seats in the European Parliament